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Abstract
The objective of the paper is to simulate the corporate value of Champagne makers by taking
into account the Champagne market evolution. These measurements are conducted by linking
financial debt, performance and valuation to a vertical coordination model of production-con-
sumption within a cobweb economy. The overall model uses the dynamic structure that under-
lies the strategic interactions amongst grape producers and wine makers. These segments
coordinate grape production and trade by forming expectations about final consumption, price
and stock risks. The paper examines the dynamics of the financial cash flows and net worth of
Champagne houses for the 1977 – 2003 period using system dynamics (SD) modeling princi-
ples. The results presented in this paper report on key financial indicators for that period for fi-
nancial debt, performance and valuation of Champagne makers. It provides a sound basis to
pursue this work, because the model can further enhanced to anticipate the possible value
Champagne makers for the coming crucial years since the Champagne appellation has reached
its geographical limit determined by the protected designation of origin (PDO), while world-
wide demand continues to grow.
Keywords: financial valuation, vertical coordination, cobweb economy, system dynamics, pri-
ce expectations, Champagne, wine
1.Introduction: Context of the Champagne Makers
The Champagne business amounted to 4.1 billion euros in 2006. It involves more than 15,000
vine growers in the area of Champagne appellation and more than 100 Champagne makers, cal-
led houses of Champagne. Several houses of Champagne were sold in the last ten years as high-
lighted in table 1. The paper models corporate values overtime, in connection with a production-
consumption cobweb phenomenon modeled by Declerck and Cloutier (2006).
It takes approximately three years to produce Champagne from raw grapes. Champagne makers
face price risks and uncertainty when purchasing grapes, the most important input in the pro-
duction process. Furthermore, wine, used as input into the process, must be produced within the
protected designation of origin (PDO) / protected geographical indication (PGI) area according
to specific EU rules. Mistaken expectations when decisions are made about crops planted may
lead to fluctuations in market prices. The cycle adjustment of supply and demand leads to jumps
and drops in retail prices during economic booms and busts, respectively. 
Demand has increased 3% annually over the last 25 years. The area in production has increased
similarly. But in 2002, the area planted amounts to about 31 000 ha, which is nearing to the legal
PDO size limit. Soon, the constraint will be very binding in the coming years. This resource
constraint will bring additional pressure on vineyard values with the set of expected conse-
quences into the functioning of the industry. 270   The Financial Value of Champagne Houses in a Cobweb Economy
Table 1. Major acquisitions of Champagne Houses, 1997-2007
Date Acquirer Target Amount of the deal 
(in million euros)
Seller
1997 Groupe Vranken Heidsieck Monopole, with 22 ha 
of vineyard
about 33.5  Seagram
1997 Boizel Chanoine 
Champagne
Philipponnat et Abel Lepître Marie Brizard




1998 Groupe LVMH De Venoge, with 17 ha of 
vineyard
Rémy-Cointreau
1998 Boizel Chanoine 
Champagne
De Venoge, without vineyard about 30.5 Groupe LVMH
1998 Boizel Chanoine 
Champagne
Alexandre Bonnet, with 41 ha of 
vineyard
Family company
1998 Champagne Delbeck 
(Financière Martin)
Champagne Bricout Kupferberg
1999 Groupe LVMH Krug, with 19 ha of vineyard 152  Rémy-Cointreau
1999 Groupe Vranken Henri Germain Frey
1999 Hicks, Muse Tate & 
Furst
Mumm et Perrier –Jouët, with 
275 ha of vineyard
297 Seagram  (Canadian  Co.)
2000 Allied Domecq Mumm et Perrier –Jouët, with 
275 ha of vineyard
575  Hicks, Muse Tate & Furst 
(US funds) and Frey 
(French fund)
2002 Groupe Vranken 
Monopole
Pommery  About 150 Groupe LVMH
2003 Groupes LVMH et 
Vranken
Bricout-Delbeck Financière  Martin
2003 Groupe Thiénot Canard-Duchêne  About 180  Groupe LVMH
2003 De Cazanove Medot
2004 Laurent-Perrier Château Malakoff, with 60 ha of 
vineyard
Family company
2004 Caisse d’Epargne Groupe Marne et Champagne 44% of the house MORA family
2004 Groupe Boizel 
Chanoine Champagne 
(BCC)
Champagne René Jardin with 21 
ha of vineyard s
About 23
2004 Compagnie financière 
Frey
Champagne Billecart-Salmon 
with 9 ha of vineyard 
45% of the house BEH (from Luxembourg)




Champagne Ayala, without 
vineyard
Compagnie financière Frey
2005 Pernod-Ricard Allied-Domecq, including 
Champagne Mumm and 
Champagne Perrier-Jouët, 
with275 ha of vineyard
10,700
 (the whole group)
Allied-Domecq (British 
Co.)
2005 Starwood Groupe  Taittinger,  including 
Champagne Taittinger with 287 
ha of vineyard and hotels
About 1,166 Groupe Taittinger 
2006 Groupe Boizel 
Chanoine Champagne 
(BCC) Offre amicale 
le 20/01/06
Groupe Lanson International 56%  MORA family
44%  Caisse d’épargne
2006 Crédit Agricole du 
Nord-Est  and the 
Taittinger family
Champagne Taittinger with 287 
ha of vineyard 287 ha de vignes
Carneros (Californian domain in 
the USA)
Bouvet-Ladubay (Saumur wine 
in France)
660,000 Starwood (US hotel Co.)Francis Declerck and L. Martin Cloutier   271
Wine makers negotiate the volume of grapes they purchase in forming expectations about the
demand for bottles three years later. But, weather conditions (hail particularly as was the case
in 2003) may lead to grape yields that are significantly lower than expected: 8 255 kg/ha, rather
than the typical mean of 13,000 kg/ha in 2003.
Cobweb phenomenon at the production-consumption interface disturbs consumers and serious-
ly affects the strategic position of wine makers, which have typically responded by introducing,
or amending, vertical coordination rules. The production-consumption has been modeled by
Declerck and Cloutier (2006). Within the scope of this paper, it is expanded with the financial
structure and performance of Champagne makers, and additional production and financial feed-
back loops. The objective of the paper is to project the financial debt level and performance of
Champagne makers over time. Both parameters can help anticipate the financial value of Cham-
pagne makers during the 1977 - 2003 period and to position work for future enhancements of
the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents a literature
overview of the financial concepts associated to corporate valuation and the ones pertaining to
vertical coordination and the cobweb economy. The third section provides an overview of stra-
tegic issues associated with the Champagne industry. The fourth section focuses on research
methods: the details of the hypotheses to be tested, model design, data sources and model cali-
bration, are presented. The fifth section exhibits simulation results to illustrate the functioning
of the model. Finally, conclusions are drawn and discussed.
2.   Literature Review
This section presents a brief literature overview of the financial concepts related to corporate
valuation and the concepts associated with vertical coordination and the cobweb economy.
2.1 Corporate finance: Corporate value maximization
Corporations act in their owners’ interest, thus, they must to maximize shareholders’ share va-
lue. This is executed through a series of business and financial decisions. Business decisions are
presented first and then financial decisions are described. Business decisions involve invest-
ment decisions. Investments are conducted to increase profits and then firm value. According
to the Modigliani-Miller separation theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), investment decisi-
ons are independent from financing decisions.
The most important financial decision is to choose the level of financial leverage. Financial le-
verage affects firm value in two ways: (1) Interest expenses are income tax deductible, and (2)
Financial leverage increases bankruptcy costs because risks of default of interest payments or/
and debt capital repayment. Corporations will increase their financial debt as long as bankruptcy
costs remain low (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Hence, corporations will maximize their value.
2.2. Mechanisms of vertical organization (transactions costs, theory of contracts)
The literature on transaction costs mentions that the strategy of vertical integration is implemen-
ted for efficiency purposes (Williamson, 1991). Based on a microeconomics and agency costs
theories, Lajili et al. (2007) suggest that vertical coordination is the most likely governance
choice in case of: (1) high asset specificity and high uncertainty, (2) higher uncertainty about272   The Financial Value of Champagne Houses in a Cobweb Economy
volume demanded, (3) small number of potential trading partners, (4) difficulty in ascertaining
quality of products by inspection so that the monitoring of inputs is crucial, (5) more effective
monitoring of inputs, (6) high frequency of transactions, (7) low uncertainty about the timing of
the obsolescence of specific assets, (8) the non-separability of inputs monitoring, and (9)
increased complexity.
To generate a sustainable competitive advantage, decision-makers achieve economic cost mini-
mization of production and transaction costs via organizational design selection (Klein et al.,
1978; Mahoney, 2004; Teece, 1984; Williamson 1975, 1985, 1991b; Milgrom and Roberts,
1992). In a study on the food manufacturing industry, Peterson et al. (2001) have suggested that
the vertical coordination strategy continuum can take five major forms: spot markets, specifica-
tion contracts, relationship-based alliances, equity-based alliances, and vertical integration. 
Time uncertainty leads to fragmented vertically coordinated markets and favors short-term tac-
tics rather than-long term strategies (Cloutier, 1999). Managers forecast consumer demand and
anticipate the reaction of other suppliers to market circumstances to adjust their own supply.
Economic business fluctuations and imbalance due to external shocks are amplified by endoge-
nous mechanisms of production and marketing, because of uncertain information and time
delays in adjusting supply to demand (Ruth et al., 1998). A long term strategy is in the economic
interest of agents in a given sector, from producers to consumers. A long-term strategy fosters:
(a) better performance of operations, (b) stable quality standards, (c) sound financial situations
and (d) risk-sharing among the different operators along the value chain (Sterman, 2000).
2.3. Economic expectations and the ‘cobweb’ phenomena
The expectations held by economic agents perform a key role in shaping dynamic behavior in
economics and finance. They affect outcomes and further influence expectations through assi-
milated learning and feedback. The role of expectations is crucial in speculative markets such
as the one of the Champagne grape. Due to grape annual production and the time required for
wine maturing, markets operate from year to year. But long-term investments in productive as-
sets create a lagged supply adjustment to demand. Ezekiel (1938) describes the ‘cobweb’ phe-
nomena, with the introduction of a theorem to explain how supply reacts to the lagged price, and
the demand adjusts to the current price. Nerlove (1958) observes adaptive expectations within
the confines of the cobweb phenomena. Cobweb strategy experiments have been used by rese-
archers interested in the formation of expectations and of their impacts. Subjects in experiments
formulate a complete strategy with price forecasts for all possible states of the world. From pe-
riod-to-period, experiment subjects may learn the market supply and demand from past period
experience and begin to form expectations (Sterman, 1988, 1989).
Further, Colucci and Valori (2006) examine feedback in agents’ expectations by introducing al-
ternative learning rules to understand actual human behavior in experiments on expectation for-
mation in a cobweb economy. The conclusion is that decision-makers may have a strong ability
to understand the impact of their expectation feedbacks. Agents form expectations repeatedly,
perhaps even over many production cycles, and have ample opportunity to learn and change
their expectation, strategy and behavior. Historical experience is an important component of
that process, but history never exactly repeats itself in periodicity and amplitude. Expectations
may turn out to be incorrect and lead to cyclical variations in prices. Mistaken expectations
when wine making decisions are made about the grape purchase may lead to fluctuations in mar-
ket prices.Francis Declerck and L. Martin Cloutier   273
Wine makers negotiate the volume of grapes they purchase in forming expectations about the
demand for bottles three years later. But, weather conditions may lead to yields of grapes that
are at lot lower than expected: 8,255 kg/ha instead of 13,000 kg/ha in 2003.
Variations in the price of Champagne are brought only by mistaken expectations and by variable
weather conditions. They show that when particular expectations are held in common by com-
peting producers, actions taken by them may lead to a disappointment about these expectations.
2.4. Vertical coordination between grape producers and Champagne makers
Lajili et al. (2007) submit that several factors can explain why the making of Champagne is ea-
sier through vertical coordination between vine growers and wine makers:
1) This factor is high asset specificity and high uncertainty: The Champagne industry must com-
ply with the legal restrictions concerning both quantity and quality on materials, method and lo-
cation. These rules induce major barriers to entry and exit in the Champagne market. Specific
barriers to entry are related to PDO rules: Champagne grapes must be harvested and processed
into wine within the geographic area of appellation with specific technological and agronomic
requirements, including the variety of vines grown, manual-only harvest, maximum authorized
yield, and the storage of ageing wine during three years (leading to more than one billion bottles
aging in cellars), a process that requires financing. 
But weather fluctuation is a risk factor affecting the production of grapes at certain critical stag-
es. 
2) This factor relates to high uncertainty about the demand volume. Because it takes about three
years from the grape harvest until ready-to-drink Champagne bottles can be sold, Champagne
makers face market risk and uncertainty at the time they buy grapes. When wine makers buy
grapes, they form expectations about the price of bottles three years later. 
3) This factor relates to the small numbers of potential trading partners. Within the industry,
Champagne makers only own 10% of the vineyards but their market share reaches 66% of the
total wine sold. Champagne makers must purchase grapes in the PDO area. The grape market
consisted of a large number of vine growers (about 18 000) facing a small number of buyers
(200 brokers and Champagne makers) in 1 200 locations.
4) This factor is associated with the difficulty in ascertaining final product quality by inspection
so the monitoring of inputs is crucial. 
5) This factor relates to the more effective monitoring of inputs. The monitoring of grapes qua-
lity is not easy in a bottle of Champagne by inspection so that the monitoring of inputs is requi-
red. Four-year contracts are signed by both parties (vine growers and wine markers). Every
transaction is recorded officially by a committee (CIVC) financed by both parties in order to
inform publicly about prices to ease relationships. 
6) This factor concerns the increased complexity of PDO regulations and contracting rules over
time. From 1959 to 1990, a contract governed all prices for grapes and also the allocation of
stocks to wine-makers; that is, vertical coordination linkages between grape producers and
Champagne makers were rigid. In recent years, four-fifth of grape purchases has been conduct-
ed using individual contracts, and the remaining purchases occur on the spot market at the time
of harvest. The market remains loosely oligopolistic since six major wine makers purchase
about 60% of grapes. 274   The Financial Value of Champagne Houses in a Cobweb Economy
2.5. Consumption-Production cycle of Champagne: Stylized facts about vertical coordination
Market sales of Champagne amounted to 3.9 billion euros in 2004 (CIVC, 2005). On the de-
mand side, shipments of bottles from wine makers to the retailers vary from year to year because
of swings in economic growth in developed countries (CIVC, 1992 - 2004). Often, a drop in
Champagne sales occurs three or four years after an economic boom, when the grapes used to
make the bottles on sale were purchased at a peak price because wine makers and vine growers
anticipated a continuing expansion. Consequently, wine makers’ profits may fluctuate a lot
from year to year (Declerck, 2005).
On the supply side, decisions taken in the adjustments for the DPO and authorized yields, toge-
ther with short-term adjustments to demand pressures by principal wine makers, seem to lead
to a cobweb phenomenon. As seen on figure 1, over the past three decades, one can observe that
patterns of consumption have exhibited three asymmetric production cycles with peaks of sales,
and price per bottle in 1979, 1989 and 1999, while sales and prices lows, following these peaks,
occur following a three-year time lag (Declerck, 2005). 
Figure 1. Shipments of Champagne from 1978 to 2006 in function deflated price per bottle ex-
pressed in constant terms (base: 2001, €)
Source: Updated from Declerck and Cloutier (2006).
In 1982, 1992 and 2001, the industry faced a lower selling price and high production costs for
bottles elaborated with grapes harvested three years earlier, and purchased at a historic high pri-
ce when the consumer demand for Champagne was high. Following each cycle, the mechanisms
of vertical coordination in place to mitigate temporal uncertainty and financial risks, mostly as-
sociated with the storage of bottles, were not sufficient to adjust to short-term pressures in de-
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3.   Research Methods
The modeling approach used in this paper is based on the principles of systems dynamics (SD).
System dynamics models are based on the principles of identifying feedback loops and expli-
citly taking into account the passage of time by introducing time delays in the modeling process
(Sterman, 2006). The first step in the modeling process is to identify the problem and its scope.
This was accomplished by combining the existing production-consumption model (see De-
clerck and Cloutier, 2006) with key financial feedback loops that drive the materialization of
the valuation process of champagne wine makers. The production-consumption submodel em-
ployed in this paper has been outlined in previous publications (Declerck and Cloutier, 2004),
and has been calibrated to historical consistency with stylized facts about the industry (historical
stocks, price series, production areas and capacity, grape yields, etc., for the 1977 – 2003 peri-
od), and it was also used in conducting prospective studies.
To expand the production-consumption model to include the capability for market valuation, a
submodel was designed on the same historical period to include the possibility to use the finan-
cial theory of the leverage effect, and the Modigliani-Miller corporate value measurement. Then
an influence diagram (ID) outlining the major and key relationships of the now production-con-
sumption subsector integrated with a financial subsector were outlined for the financial valua-
tion component. In SD principles, the ID represents the “dynamic hypothesis” of a model, it is
a “maintained” hypothesis of the way a model structure is characterizing a given system. One
of the most delicate dimensions of the model design is to identify key feedback loops between
the production-consumption and financial submodels. The resulting ID is represented in figure
2. The main aspect of the dynamic hypothesis, as it relates to the corporate valuation examined
in this paper is to explain how the feedback loops between production variables (according to
the phase of the cycle), on the one hand, and financial debt level and performance of Champa-
gne makers, on another hand (Declerck, 2005). This opens a range of possibilities for a newer
understanding and demonstration of the impact of the Champagne production–consumption cy-
cle on the financial structure and performance of Champagne makers, and back.
The third step in the SD research process consists in translating the ID into a quantitative level-
rate model and in its calibration using historical data. The level-rate model was designed using
the software Powersim. The details about the production-consumption subsector of the model
are described in Declerck and Cloutier (2006). The production-consumption subsector uses data
and estimated fitted curves for production and consumption from the Champagne trade associa-
tion (CIVC, 1978 - 2003). The financial subsector was calibrated using financial data compiled
by Banque de France on the Champagne industry (Banque de France, 1978 – 2003). The links
established between the two submodels and the connection between these data sets use a series
of assumptions and “checks” into the data can be obtained from the authors. 
The fourth step consists in assessing the model for both its internal and external consistencies.
It is the case, that within the context of this research, there are data available against which it is
possible to check for historical consistency on most level and rate variables of the model. Note
that economic and financial theories form underlying principles employed in identifying the
feedback for building the model. 
Finally, some financial indicators were selected to examine the behavior of the model. These
are, the Champagne Houses’ estimated financial values using market multiples. According to
Declerck (2005), it is assumed that Champagne Houses’ corporate value is worth four times its
sales, twelve times its EBITDA, fifteen times its EBIT and twenty-two times its net profit.
These financial intermediate variables were estimated according to corporate decisions rules:
investment decision, financial debt leverage and time horizon of loans, dividend policy and de-
preciation rate.276   The Financial Value of Champagne Houses in a Cobweb Economy
Figure 2. Diagram of influence about Champagne production and value of Champagne houses
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4.   Influence Diagram: Dynamic Hypothesis
Figure 2 presents the influence diagram (ID) for both the production-consumption and financial
subsectors to value the houses of Champagne. The production-consumption subsector includes
four balancing feedback loops. The finance subsector includes three reinforcing feeback loops.
At the interface between the production-consumption and the finance subsectors there is one ba-
lancing loop. 
Feedback loop B1 is the short-term supply response of producers. The price of champagne in-
fluences the increase in authorized yields, which in turn will increase the stocks produced. Si-
milarly, the balancing feedback loop B2, describes the long-term supply response of producers,
this time, the margins on grapes leads to the formation of expectations, and to long term pres-
sures to increase the production area (PDO). Both balancing loops B1 and B2 will produce more
wine bottles and structure the supply dynamics. The balancing loop B3, corresponds to consu-
mer demand and shipments. The price of Champagne drives the demand.
The finance subsector includes three level variables in the level-rate version of the model: (1)
fixed assets, (2) equity capital, and (3) financial debt. But, in the ID, only three main reinforcing
feedback loops are represented. In this model, the feedback loop R2, shows that an increase in
free cash flow lowers the financial debt. Conversely, lower financial debt leads to greater free
cash flow. In addition, from feedback loop R1, the higher the financial debt, the more profits
will be eroded. Profits produce greater cash flow. In the reinforcing loop R3, greater profits, ge-
nerate equity capital, which in then produce greater cash flow.
The key elements that connect the two subsectors of the model are part of the balancing loop
B4. Two main sets of influences were established between the submodels. First, balancing loop
B4, endogenizes the sales level (price multiplied by shipments (quantity)), from the production
subsector to the finance subsector to determine the total sales in the industry. Second, the fi-
nance subsector endogenizes the margins on grapes, calculated from sales and input costs,
which influences the long-term supply response in the production-consumption submodel.
5.   Results 
The results of the model are provided from 1977 to 2003. Simulated stocks of Champagne bott-
les show similar patterns to historic stocks, as drawn on figure 3. It signals the robustness of the
model.
Figure 4 shows that the level of financial debt increases strongly during the last decade. Surpri-
singly, the financial expenses are more variable as plotted on figure 5. 
Figure 6 exhibits four estimations of the valuation of Champagne houses: the value of sales,
EBITDA, EBIT and net profit. The value of Champagne sales has strongly increased since
1997. It presents patterns that are very different from those shown by other market multiples,
such as EBITDA, EBIT and net income. Corporate valuation using EBITDA, EBIT and net pro-
fit are very consistent. EBITDA, EBIT and net profit made by Champagne Houses, that are key
elements used for valuation with market multiples. The measures are dependent on the diffe-
rence between the sales and the input cost of grapes. The financial effect of leverage is positive
since net profit has increased from 1999 while financial debts have also grown fast. 278   The Financial Value of Champagne Houses in a Cobweb Economy
Figure 3. Stocks of Champagne bottles from 1977 to 2003: historic and simulated levels 
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Figure 5. Simulated Financial expenses paid by Champagne Houses from 1977 to 2003 
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5.   Conclusion and Perspectives
The corporate value of Champagne houses has been modelled by linking a production-con-
sumption phenomenon to financial measures. Corporate values of Champagne houses are esti-
mated  as four times their sales, twelve times their EBITDA, fifteen times their EBIT and
twenty-two times their net profit.
Next step in further research may be to set up scenarios for the future decade. Scenarios may be
conducted in assuming different levels of demand growth while supply is constrained by legal
rules (the size limit of the area in appellation has been reached; the yield level is limited but
could be modified quite easily). Different assumptions may also be assessed on the supply side.
Then, the market price of Champagne may be found and the input cost of grapes may be infer-
red. On the side of Champagne house, the needs in investment and financial debt can be com-
puted. So expected sales, EBITDA, EBIT and net profit can be estimated. Consequently, the
corporate value of Champagne houses can be estimated year after year.
Such a model is a useful guide to decision-maker because it helps anticipate better corporate va-
lue and to understand the future of value creation in the context where the features of the DPO
are being revised. Such a model is particularly useful for Champagne houses and vine growers
who negotiate authorized annual yield and the revision of the area of appellation together and
with the State and European authority. 
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